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Removing bank subsidies leads inexorably to full reserve 
banking. 
R.S.Musgrave. 
 
Summary. The recent banking crisis laid bare a long standing and 
inherent defect in fractional reserve banking: the fact that fractional 
reserve is unlikely to work for long without taxpayer backing. Changing 
bank regulations in such a way that banks are never a burden on 
taxpayers leads inexorably to full reserve banking.  
Full reserve involves splitting the banking industry into two halves. A 
safe half where depositors earn no interest, but they do have instant 
access to their money, and a second half in which depositors do earn a 
dividend or interest, but instant access is not guaranteed and depositors 
bear the losses when the investments or loans to which their money is 
channelled go wrong. Whether the second half counts as “banking” is 
debatable. Also whether that split is within banks or involves splitting the 
banking industry into two different types of institution is unimportant. 
It is virtually impossible for a full reserve bank to fail, thus there is no 
implicit taxpayer subsidy of such banks. As to the safe half, deposits are 
not loaned on or invested, thus the relevant money is not put at risk. And 
as to the “investment” half, if the value of the relevant loans or 
investments fall, then depositors lose in the same way as investors lose 
given a stock market set back. And stock market set-backs do not cause 
the same sort of crises as bank panics. 
The reduced amount of lending based economic activity and increased 
amount of non-lending based activity that results from full reserve is an 
entirely predictable result of removing bank subsidies. Far from reducing 
GDP, removing subsidies normally increases GDP, and there is no 
reason to suppose GDP would not rise as a result of removing bank 
subsidies: i.e. switching to full reserve banking. 
Section I sets out the argument, and section II deals with some common 
criticisms of full reserve banking. 
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Definitions. 
 
 
Bank.  The word bank is used here very much as per Oxford Dictionary 
of Economics. The latter starts its definition: “A financial institution 
whose main activities are borrowing and lending money. Banks borrow 
by accepting deposits from the general public or other financial 
institutions.” 
 
Money.   Likewise, the word “money” is used very much as per 
standard definitions, that is, the word is used to refer to anything widely 
accepted in payment for goods and services or in settlement of debts. 
 
Full reserve banking.   This is also known as 100% reserve or narrow 
banking. It is a system where only the central bank creates money. That 
is in contrast to the existing fractional reserve system under which 
commercial banks when making a loan do not need to obtain funds from 
depositors or others before making loans: commercial banks can simply 
credit borrowers’ accounts with money produced from thin air. 
There are of course differences between central bank and commercial 
bank created money, so to that extent the above definition of full reserve 
banking over-simplifies things. However, both types of money fit the 
above definition of the word money. 
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Section I.   Removing bank subsidies leads inexorably to 
full reserve banking. 
 
A fundamental and very simple principle that should underlie banking is 
that banking is a business like any other: it should make a profit or at 
least break even. That is, the normal assumption in economics is that 
resources are best allocated and GDP is maximised where market 
forces prevail, unless overriding social considerations or market failure 
can be demonstrated. And having “market forces prevail” means abiding 
by the latter “break even” condition. All the arguments and conclusions 
below flow that very simple and widely accepted principle. 
The latter mode of argument, that is arguing FROM the proposition that 
businesses should at least break even TO full reserve is a robust form of 
argument for full reserve, because the latter “break even” idea is widely 
accepted. 
 
The basic flaw in banking. 
There is a very simple and basic flaw which lies at the heart of banking 
as it has been practiced for centuries, and which breaks the latter 
principle. It is thus. 
The value of the bulk of bank’s liabilities (deposits) are fixed in money 
unit terms (i.e. in terms of dollars, pounds, etc). In contrast, their assets 
(loans, investments, etc) vary significantly in value, and can and do fall 
disastrously in value from time to time. That happens when a bank 
makes a string of bad loans or investments: something that is 
guaranteed to happen sooner or later. 
The latter large fall in value has happened over and again and has led to 
repeated bank failures throughout history. And that problem is currently 
solved by taxpayer backing, which amounts to a subsidy of the banking 
industry: the so called “too big to fail subsidy” (TBTF). But the latter 
subsidy contravenes the basic principle set out at the start above, 
namely that banks should not be subsidised. (As to the actual size of 
subsidies enjoyed by banks, there are numerous estimates. Haldane 
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(2011a&b) puts the subsidies at several times bank profits, which if true 
would make fractional reserve banks LUDICROUSLY uneconomic.) 
Moreover, contravention of the “break even” principle is worse than 
might at first appear, and for five reasons. 
1. There is the “lender of last resort” facility offered by central banks to 
commercial banks. Now if supposedly “commercial” banks have the 
luxury of lender of last resort, then every other business should have 
access to the same facility if there is to be an absence of bank subsidies 
or absence of preferential treatment for banks.  
But even better would be no such facility at all. Reason is that funds for 
such a facility are inevitably funds withdrawn from the rest of the 
economy, that is from viable businesses (assuming constant GDP). Put 
another way, absent last resort largesse, the relevant funds would be 
available to be spent on goods and services provided by normal and 
viable businesses. 
2. The lender of last resort facility is supposed to be on the basis of the 
principles set out by Walter Bagehot, namely that funds are available 
only at penalty rates and in exchange for first class collateral. In practice 
of course, lender of last resort has degenerated into almost the opposite: 
that is in the recent crises, banks have sometimes been offered loans at 
very favourable rates and on the basis of QUESTIONABLE collateral.  
3. Bagehot did not even approve of central banks or of the lender of last 
resort facility. His point was that if central banks exist and offer a lender 
of last resort facility, it should be on the basis of penalty rates and first 
class collateral (see Selgin (2010:p.492)). 
4. Another form of preferential treatment for banks is that in recent 
decades they have been allowed to publish balance sheets which are 
essentially works of fiction (Peston (2012, p.15-16): an activity which 
would result in severe penalties for the directors and/or accountants of 
any other business. 
5. The main beneficiaries of bank bail outs and the TBTF subsidy are 
those with above average amounts of money deposited in banks. Thus 
those subsidies pretty much amount to the average taxpayer subsidising 
the rich: a policy devoid of social justice. Indeed that unjust policy has 
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taken an even more extreme form over the last five years in the form of 
having ordinary taxpayers rescue not just rich depositors, but bond-
holders as well! The latter policy caused extreme and justified 
resentment amongst the less well off in some Euro periphery countries, 
like Ireland. 
The above points can be put another way and as follows. When 
someone invests DIRECT (for example in property or the stock 
exchange) and it goes wrong, they lose money, and quite right. On the 
other hand if they put their money into a bank and the bank invests in 
property or the stock exchange and it goes wrong, the depositor / 
investor is rescued by the taxpayer. Advocates of the existing banking 
system need to tell us what the justification is for the latter artificial 
assistance for banks and their customers. Of course those advocates 
cannot answer the latter question. In fact I know of no instances of them 
even asking the question, and if there are indeed no such instances or 
very few, that says something about the tenuous grip on reality 
possessed by advocates of fractional reserve banking. 
It follows from the above that the only system that completely dispenses 
with bank subsidies is one that makes it abundantly clear that under no 
circumstances will there be any taxpayer assistance for banks. And as to 
the idea that the current attempts at bank reform (Basel III, ICB (2011), 
etc) actually achieve the latter “abundant clarity”, that is laughable. 
As the governor of the Bank of England at the time of writing (King 2010)      
put it, “Basel III on its own will not prevent another crisis..”. Plus there 
are more references below to the widespread scepticism about current 
attempts at reform. And we all know what will happen come the “next 
crisis”: taxpayers will come riding to the rescue. So current attempts at 
reform just don’t remove the TBTF subsidy or the spectacular billion 
dollar bailouts that will appear come the next crisis. 
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Instant access accounts should not earn interest. 
To summarise so far, the basic activity carried out by banks, namely, 1, 
taking deposits, 2, lending on or investing the relevant money, while 3, 
promising to return the exact sums deposited to depositors is nonsense, 
because it is almost guaranteed at some point to fail, which in turn 
makes bank subsidies necessary.  
So the obvious conclusion would seem to be that banks should not lend 
on or invest depositors’ money. Indeed, if banks do not lend on such 
money, that money is then very near 100% safe, which in turn means no 
taxpayer exposure or taxpayer funded subsidy.  
Or as King (2010) put it: “If there is a need for genuinely safe deposits 
the only way they can be provided, while ensuring costs and benefits are 
fully aligned, is to insist such deposits do not coexist with risky assets.”  
Moreover, where money is not lent on, it does not earn interest, thus 
depositors who want 100% safety cannot expect any interest (not that 
depositors get any significant interest anyway at the time of writing). 
So called banks which simply accept deposits and do nothing with those 
deposits will henceforth be referred to as “depository banks”. 
(Incidentally, the obvious objection to the latter sort of system, namely 
that it would curtail bank lending and hinder economic growth, is dealt 
with in Section II below.) 
 
Depositors who want interest must accept risk. 
As distinct from the above mentioned depositors who want 100% safety 
and accept that that means they get no interest, there are depositor / 
investors who want some sort of interest or dividend on their money.  
However it is a flagrant self-contradiction to ask for interest or a dividend 
AND for 100% safety. Reason is, as already intimated, that the only way 
interest can be earned is by lending on or investing money, and the very 
fact of doing that means the money is not 100% safe: the loans or 
investments can go wrong.  
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(Of course some form of self-funding insurance, like FDIC in the US, can 
deal with the failure of a small bank. However, when it comes to 
systemic failure or the failure of an individual large bank, only the state 
can come to the rescue, and indeed, entire states have been near 
bankrupted in the recent crisis.) 
Thus if the basic principle mentioned at the start above (namely that 
banks should pay their way) is to be observed, depositors who want 
interest must carry the loss when the underlying loans go wrong. And 
where the latter policy obtains, those depositors are little different to 
bank shareholders. Or put another way, such depositors are little 
different to those who buy into unit trusts (“mutual funds” in the US). 
Indeed, Kotlikoff (2012 & 2010), an advocate of full reserve, argues that 
where depositors want interest and are prepared to take the concomitant 
risk, they should SPECIFICALLY be offered a range of unit trusts to 
choose from. 
Moreover, unit trusts, whether they are run by banks or not are 
essentially separate from banks. Certainly if the assets of an EXISTING 
unit trust run by a bank turned out to be worthless, that is not supposed 
to harm depositors, or bondholders or shareholders of the bank itself. 
Indeed, there is much merit in making unit trusts run by banks fully open 
to or available to those who ARE NOT customers of the bank in 
question: it increases the independence of those trusts from the relevant 
banks still further. First that tests the value of the relevant units. Second, 
absent the latter “independence”, under a Kotlikoff system, it is 100% 
certain that banks would try to promise their existing customers that 
investments in their unit trusts were as good as cash and would try to 
maintain that fiction by restricting access to bank run unit trusts to 
existing bank customers.  Commercial banks always want to get into the 
money creation or seignorage business, and the latter is one way of 
doing it. That is, absent any test of the real value of those unit trusts, 
banks might claim those trusts’ value was more than was really the 
case. And that would enable banks to turn unit trust units into a form of 
quasi-money. Thus if full reserve were to be introduced along “Kotlikoff” 
lines, there are good reasons for having any unit trusts run by banks 
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very much separate entities from banks themselves,  just as is the case 
with unit trusts currently run by banks. 
To summarise, there is a logical place for institutions that accept 
deposits, but do nothing with those deposits (depository banks). Plus 
there is a logical place for institutions which (like unit trusts) accept 
investors’ money, but do not promise to return any SPECIFIC SUM to 
such investors.  
As to institutions which fall within the above Oxford Dictionary Definition 
of the word “bank”, there is no place for such institutions: at least not if 
the principle mentioned at the outset is to be obeyed, namely that 
commercial organisations should make a profit or at least break even. 
In other words to use the phrase “ring fence” (a phrase popularised by 
Britain’s Independent Commission on Banking (ICB (2011))), the fence 
should be between on the one hand, safe accounts and on the other 
hand, investment accounts or unit trusts or other investing / lending 
institutions. 
 
Full reserve banks do not create money. 
Under fractional reserve, commercial banks can create money when 
they lend. That is, where a bank grants a loan which is not matched by 
any corresponding “loan reduction” or loan repayment, then money 
creation takes place. The latter process involves simply crediting the 
borrower’s account with money that comes from nowhere. 
Now since depository banks do not lend, they do not create money. 
Thus such banks are essentially full reserve banks.  
As to investing institutions like unit trusts, they do not create money 
either. That is, when someone invests £X in a unit trust for example, 
they lose £X and gain £X of units. That is different to where someone 
deposits £X in a traditional bank and their money is loaned on. In that 
case, both depositor and borrower hold £X: that is, £X is turned into £2X. 
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Bank failure is near impossible under full reserve. 
Under full reserve, and absent large scale and blatant criminality, it is 
impossible for depository banks to fail. As to investing institutions, they 
are not prone to the sort of sudden collapse or “run” that occurs with 
traditional or existing banks. Of course a significant fall in the value of 
unit trusts can take place. But that is not the same as a run on a 
traditional bank. A bank run can start where there is just a SUSPICION 
that the bank is insolvent. And which TYPE OF insolvency is involved – 
cash flow insolvent, balance sheet insolvency, etc – does not matter too 
much. 
In contrast, those who buy into unit trusts or similar investing entities DO 
NOT EXPECT to be able necessarily to withdraw exactly the sum that 
they invested. At worst, the value of unit trust falls. But that happens 
every time there is a stock market set-back, and stock market set-backs 
of themselves do not cause recessions. 
Or as King (2010) put it, “And we saw in 1987 and again in the early 
2000s, that a sharp fall in equity values did not cause the same damage 
as did the banking crisis. Equity markets provide a natural safety 
valveM” 
  
The Werner system. 
There are of course variations on the full reserve theme. One was set 
out by Werner (2010). Under the latter system, those wanting their 
money invested rather than simply being lodged in a 100% safe manner, 
put their money into so called investment accounts for a specific and 
longish period, or they have to give a period of notice before withdrawing 
their money. 
Under that system, if the average maturity of those deposits is less than 
the maturity of the relevant investments, then maturity transformation 
(MT) takes place, which in turn amounts to money creation. And there is 
no question but that MT involves risks. That is, it is precisely MT (i.e. 
“borrow short and lend long”) that has brought down hundreds of banks 
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throughout history, Northern Rock being just a recent example. In short, 
MT necessitates bank subsidies. 
So to ensure no risks of the latter sort arise, the above average 
maturities have to match. But even then it’s possible that the value of the 
relevant investments declines substantially, in which case the bank may 
not be able to repay depositors. Werner does advocate letting depositors 
choose how much risk they are prepared to accept (in exchange for a 
better or worse rate of interest or dividend). But if investors are not 
exposed to losing all their money, then someone carries the risk. And we 
all know who that is: the taxpayer.  
Thus the Kotlikoff system seems preferable. Under the latter system, 
depositors are free to try to cash in their investment any time, but the 
risk is that that depresses the value of the relevant investments, which in 
turn dissuades others from cashing in. The Kotlikoff system certainly 
gives depositor / investors more flexibility. 
For that reason, the Kotlikoff system will be assumed from now on. 
 
Money market funds and checking facilities. 
In the U.S. there are so called “money market funds” which offer 
checking facilities and invest only in supposedly safe securities, which 
makes them compliant or very near compliant with the principles of full 
reserve. 
Kotlikoff actually regards these funds as being “compliant”. But there are 
two problems with with counting ANY FORM of investment (even if only 
in government securities) as “full reserve compliant”. 
1. Financial institutions may bribe or cajole politicians and regulators into 
progressively accepting and counting ever more risky investments as 
being compliant. 
The latter is not a problem at the moment because money market funds 
are run by risk averse individuals, while “riskphiles” work for investment 
banks. But if the activities of banks, investment banks included were to 
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be more heavily regulated, there could be a movement of riskphiles, 
accompanied by smart lawyers, into the money market fund sector. 
2. As to the government debt that money market funds invest in, that is 
far from entirely safe. Government securities even in well run countries 
rise and fall substantially in value. As to the idea that the debt of 
Eurozone periphery countries is safe at the time of writing, that is 
completely unrealistic. Indeed, one money market fund in the US failed 
during the recent crisis. 
So much the best solution here is a clear line in the sand: “instant 
access or checking account money should never be invested in 
anything”. 
The alternative (for those who want to invest in very safe securities) is to 
have unit trusts or similar investing institutions which (a la Kotlikoff) 
concentrate on such securities. But in that case the value of depositors’ 
stakes must be allowed to float (again a la Kotlikoff). Indeed the 
Financial Stability Oversight Council in the U.S. has realised this. See 
Wall Street Journal (2012). 
 
A subsidy free fractional reserve system. 
Having argued that removing bank subsidies leads to full reserve, it 
could be argued that a subsidy free fractional reserve system would be 
possible. That is, it would be possible under a fractional reserve system 
for government to simply refuse to recompense depositors in the event 
of a bank failing (as indeed was the case in for example the US prior to 
the 1930s). But in that case, depositors become risk carriers, just as 
under the full reserve system advocated here: i.e. those depositors 
become very similar to bank shareholders. So that system comes to 
much the same as full reserve. 
As to depositors who wanted 100% safety under the above “subsidy free 
fractional reserve” system, they would go for government provided 
savings accounts of some sort (e.g. National Savings and Investments in 
the UK). And that also amounts to the same thing as full reserve. 
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Section II: The alleged justifications for fractional reserve. 
 
What is wrong with improved capital ratios a la Basel? 
The obvious alternative to the near 100% safe banks that full reserve 
brings is to retain fractional reserve and improve capital ratios and/or 
make sure bondholders bear some of the costs when a bank fails. 
Indeed the latter sort of objective is very much what the ICB, Basel III 
and Frank-Dodd are all about. And certainly such legislation could in 
theory make banks near 100% safe. But there are several problems with 
the latter sort of legislation. I will set out the problems briefly, and then 
consider each in detail. 
1. ICB type legislation is complicated. 2. Because of the complexity, it is 
easy for banks to water down the legislation via lobbying. 3. Fractional 
reserve does give private banks freedom to influence stimulus, but it is 
largely governments nowadays that determine stimulus, plus banks tend 
to give stimulus a boost just when it is not needed. 4. Fractional reserve 
does give banks more freedom to boost lending given an increased 
number of viable lending opportunities. Unfortunately “viability” is 
normally code for “speculation”, and even where it is not, the latter boost 
to lending just boosts inflation. 
Now for a more detailed consideration of those four points. 
1. ICB or Basel type regulation is horrendously complicated.  
Many economists are frustrated by this complexity, for example Haldane 
(2012) in his introduction, Kay (2009, p. 9-10), Mallaby (2012) and 
Rogoff (2012). The need for simplification is referred to in the preface of 
Kregel (2012).  
In contrast, the basic rules of full reserve are just two in number and are 
simple. First, banks or other entities which hold money on behalf of 
depositors cannot invest or lend on that money if the depositor wants 
100% safety and/or instant access to the money. Second, if the 
depositor is prepared to forego instant access and have their money 
invested or loaned on with a view to earning interest or a dividend, the 
depositor loses access to money, and instead holds an asset which is 
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little different to a shareholding or a stake in the latter investments or 
loans. 
Science awards top marks to the simple ideas that explain a lot, with 
E=MC2 being a classic example. Conversely it is right to be suspicious of 
complex alleged solutions to problems. 
 
2. Banks devote HUGE efforts to watering down bank regulations. For 
example in Britain, the finance industry spends £93 million a year on 
lobbying (Mathaison (2012). A complex set of rules governing some 
reserve figure other than 100% is easy for banks to nibble away at. In 
contrast, 100% is a clear line in the sand. 
In fact it is debatable as to how much “nibbling” banks would need to do 
since they seem to have ALREADY watered down ICB and Basel type 
legislation to near impotence. For example thanks to bank lobbying, the 
capital adequacy ratio suggested by Basel III (33:1) is no different to the 
ratio at Lehmans with it failed.  
 
3. There is a popular argument to the effect that fractional reserve 
somehow absolves governments and central banks from creating money 
or providing stimulus: the “burden” so to speak is carried by private 
banks. For example Kregel (2012) in criticising the full reserve 
arguments put by Minsky (1995) says in reference to full reserve “This 
would be a system marked by a chronic tendency toward deflation, 
making it even more reliant on demand injections from the government.” 
(Wolf (2012) made a similar point when he said “I cannot see why the 
right answer should be no leverage at all. An intermediary that can never 
fail is surely also far too safe.” 
There are five answers to the above sort of point as follows. 
i) Kregel & Co may not have noticed, but economies are heavily 
dependent on “demand injections from government” anyway! That is, 
come a recession, everyone looks to the central bank to reduce interest 
rates or for government to implement fiscal stimulus. (It is true that in the 
recent crisis, particularly in the UK, there have been calls for more bank 
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lending. But that is unusual, and is a peculiarity of the recent crisis which 
was very much caused by banks. I.e. normally, when stimulus is 
required, everyone looks to monetary and/or fiscal policies for solutions. 
ii) As to Kregel’s suggestion that banks can bring “injection”, they are 
certainly likely to do that from time to time under fractional reserve. But 
they are likely to do so in a boom: exactly when more injection is not 
needed! And of course the most dramatic recent example of that was the 
credit fuelled house price boom that preceded the recent crisis, followed 
by mega bank bail outs, followed by the worst recession since the 1930: 
hardly an advertisement for letting banks influence stimulus. As the head 
of Britain’s Financial Services Authority (Turner (2012)) put it, “The 
financial crisis of 2007/08 occurred because we failed to constrain the 
private financial system’s creation of private credit and money.” 
iii) Given that we already have a system for effecting stimulus (monetary 
/ fiscal policy), letting banks affect stimulus is clear prima facie case of 
duplication of effort. Or put it another way, on the face of it, it 
contravenes the Tinbergen principle. (The latter principle states, roughly 
speaking, that for each policy objective (e.g. effecting stimulus) one 
policy instrument and one only is required).  
Thus the advocates of private bank effected stimulus need to tell us why 
this duplication of effort is justified. As far as I know it has never 
occurred to them that duplication of effort is involved, never mind 
justifying that duplication. 
iv). As to Kregel’s “deflation” point, that was dealt with above. To recap 
briefly, the answer to that point is that introducing full reserve probably 
has an initial deflationary effect, but that effect is easily dealt with by 
having government / central bank create and spend extra money into the 
economy. As to the word “chronic”, that is just emotive rhetoric, which 
Kregel fails to substantiate. 
v). In addition to the above mentioned EVIDENCE as to what happens 
when private banks influence stimulus, there is a theoretical flaw in the 
idea, as follows. 
Economic expansion can be led either by a general increase in demand 
which of course results in some extra lending and investment. Or it can 
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be led just by additional lending. However, there are no circumstances in 
which the latter makes sense. This however, this is a complicated point, 
and it is not possible to do the point full justice here. So what follows is 
brief and simplified version of the argument. 
Let us take two scenarios: first where an economy is at capacity and 
second where it is operating at below capacity, and I’ll consider the first 
one first. 
If an economy is at capacity, and everything is in equilibrium (e.g. 
interest rates and investment are optimum) there is no reason for 
additional lending because the amount of lending is already optimum: 
extra lending will simply lead to excess demand and inflation. However, 
extra lending can very easily take place given excess bank reserves as 
explained by Selgin (2012). Plus extra lending can take place where 
interest rates are at their optimum or free market level as pointed out by 
Huber (2009: p.31). Huber’s point is that most entities that borrow and 
lend have to pay interest to those they borrow from, while in contrast, 
banks do not always do this. That is, banks can simply create money 
from thin air and lend it out, and that activity clearly has a stimulatory 
effect.  So in a “Selgin” or “Huber” scenario, bank determined injection 
can occur when it is not needed. And of course that Selgin and Huber 
theory is backed by the evidence: the recent crisis. 
Now let us take the second assumption, namely that an economy is 
operating at below capacity. In that scenario obviously extra demand is 
needed. But whence the assumption that ALL THAT DEMAND (or most 
of it) should come via extra lending rather than via a GENERAL or broad 
based rise in demand? There is absolutely no reason. At least there is 
no reason given the assumptions made above, namely that everything is 
optimum and that includes the assumption that lending and investment 
are optimum relative to GDP (a GDP which of course is sub-optimum). 
Indeed, one work which advocates full reserve (Werner (2010)) 
specifically advocates that any additional demand should be broad 
based, and not concentrated on lending or investment. 
vi) As for any idea that full reserve in making government entirely 
responsible for stimulus imposes some sort of “burden” on government 
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or central bank, that is completely untrue in that creating new money 
costs nothing in real terms. 
As Friedman (1960, Ch 3) put it, “It need cost society essentially nothing 
in real resources to provide the individual with the current services of an 
additional dollar in cash balances.” (Incidentally, that quote is from a 
book of Friedman’s which actually advocates full reserve banking.) 
 
4. Another fallacious argument for fractional reserve is that if banks see 
more than the normal number of viable lending opportunities, they are 
free under fractional reserve to create new money and fund those 
opportunities, whereas under full reserve with its relatively fixed money 
supply, banks would be more restricted, and given the increased 
demand for loanable funds, interest rates would probably rise. 
The first flaw in that argument is that when private banks see what they 
think is an increased number of viable lending opportunities, they are 
normally looking at a mirage. That is, so called “viability” consists of 
loans made with a view to stock market speculation, as was the case 
just prior to the 1929 crash. Alternatively there was the property 
speculation that preceded the recent crisis. 
But let us suppose that banks see an increased number of GENUINELY 
viable lending opportunities, e.g. a spate of technological improvements 
that call for increased investment. Under fractional reserve, banks would 
create and lend out new money, but unfortunately the effect would be 
stimulatory. And assuming the economy was already at capacity, the 
result would be excess inflation. 
In contrast, under full reserve, the relatively inflexible supply of money 
would result in interest rates rising. That would reduce the extra 
investment spending a bit, plus it would induce extra saving, which 
would have a deflationary effect which would counter the stimulatory 
effect coming the extra investment spending. And the net result of that, 
ideally, would be no excess inflation. 
So the answer to the above Kregel type point is that both the theory and 
the evidence is that when the banking system has the freedom to 
influence stimulus or “injection”, it is likely to effect it when it is not 
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needed. Second, where stimulus IS NEEDED, but everything else is 
optimum, there is no reason for the bulk of such stimulus to be led by or 
to consist mainly of extra bank lending. Thus the above “Kregel” criticism 
of full reserve, namely that it is a system that is reliant on government for 
“injections” or stimulus does not stand inspection. 
 
Idle money is a waste of resources? 
As already pointed out, fractional reserve involves letting safe or instant 
access money be invested or loaned on, and that, according to the 
advocates of fractional reserve involves making full use of such money 
or “capital”. 
The latter sort of idea lies at the heart of ICB thinking. To quote: “The 
economy would suffer if separation prevented retail deposits from 
financing household mortgages and some business investment.”  And 
much the same point is made by Diamond (2008, Section III) and Kregel 
(2012). The flaw in that argument is as follows. 
The amount of money in “retail deposits” is at its current size partly 
thanks to bank subsidies. That is, if a particular form of saving is made 
100% safe thanks to taxpayer largesse, then there will be more of that 
type of saving. Secondly, the amount of that money that is currently 
invested is boosted by the same factor: the fact that those investments 
are underwritten by the taxpayer. That is, (to repeat) depositors can 
enjoy 100% certainty of getting their money back while enjoying the 
rewards of having their money put into less than 100% investments, and 
partially thanks taxpayers. 
In other words the amount of lending and investment currently done via 
banks is artificially inflated because of taxpayer backing. Thus, far from 
“the economy suffering” when that subsidy is withdrawn, the effect would 
be the OPPOSITE. Reason is (to repeat) that unless there is a good 
reason for a subsidy, GDP rises when a subsidy is withdrawn. 
The ICB type argument amounts simply to saying “lending and/or 
investment are good, so the more of it we have the better”: clearly a 
nonsensical argument. 
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As to any deflationary effect that comes the decline in lending that would 
occur on implementing full reserve, that is easily countered by increasing 
the TOTAL AMOUNT OF MONEY, i.e. the total money supply. And 
doing that costs precisely and exactly nothing in real terms, as pointed 
out in the above Friedman quote. (Indeed, increasing the total stock of 
central bank money in the hands of private sector entities is inherent to 
full reserve.) 
 
Full reserve reduces individual banks’ freedom to lend? 
There is a variation on the “full reserve reduces lending” fallacy which is 
the claim that under full reserve, an INDIVIDUAL bank which sees more 
than the usual number of viable lending opportunities would not be able 
to increase its lending by the required amount. 
There are four flaws in that point, as follows. 
1. Regardless of what banking system prevails, there are limits to how 
fast an INDIVIDUAL commercial bank can expand its loan book relative 
to the rate at which other banks are expanding (as is widely 
appreciated). Reason is that any such relatively fast expansion results in 
the expanding bank losing reserves. 
2. There are of course solutions to the latter problem. One is for the 
quickly expanding bank to go into partnership with other lending entities 
who have spare funds to lend. Indeed those sort of partnerships are 
already common when it comes to lending very large amounts. 
An alternative is for the above “individual” bank or lending / investing 
institution to borrow from other lending institutions (inter-bank lending). 
And that again has been common practice for a long time. (The only 
difference would be that under full reserve, the lender would take a stake 
or shareholding in the borrowing entity.)    
However, the outstanding example of a bank that relied heavily in inter-
bank lending or wholesale money markets in the UK recently was 
Northern Rock, which went bust: not exactly a ringing endorsement for 
the idea that there is huge merit in allowing an individual bank to expand 
much faster than others. 
21 
 
 
3. Even if the amount of lending per bank or unit trust were somehow 
fixed, banks or other lending / investing institutions would just restrict 
lending to the MOST VIABLE borrowers, while turning down the 
borrowers of marginal viability. And the economy suffers very little when 
projects of marginal viability are stopped or delayed. 
4. As regards INDIVIDUAL and particularly large loans, the relevant 
borrower is likely to be able to access the stock exchange or wholesale 
money markets. 
Conclusion: the idea that banks’ reduced freedom to lend is some sort of 
defect in full reserve does not stand inspection.  
 
Political problems.  
Full reserve would be a big change from the current system, and as is 
often the case with big changes, that would probably result in protests 
from those adversely affected, while those who benefit would keep quiet. 
In particular, those who think they have some sort of right to the 
combination of 100% safe bank accounts plus interest will object. 
However that is just “bread and circuses” all over again. Or as Samuel 
Brittan once correctly pointed out, implementing subsidies is easy, while 
removing them is difficult. The fact that the masses in Ancient Rome 
objected when free entertainment at the Colosseum was not up to 
scratch does not prove that free entertainment makes sense.  
But sometimes we just have to bow to political forces, and the solution 
here might be to allow every citizen some sort of account at an institution 
like National Savings and Investments (NSI) which operates in Britain. 
NSI offers deposit accounts which are “too good to be true”: that is they 
offer a combination of interest and inflation proofing that commercial 
banks cannot match. As a result, the amount that can be invested per 
person in those accounts is limited. And the idea that everyone is 
entitled to a “too good to be true” account, while the amount deposited 
per person is limited, would probably have political appeal. 
Incidentally, there would be no need under the above NSI idea for 
everyone to open their own NSI account. That is, a rule could be 
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implemented under which commercial banks paid interest to depositors 
with safe accounts up to the above mentioned limit, and obtained the 
money for interest from NSI (i.e. government). As to whether there would 
be any point in commercial banks lodging the capital sums involved with 
NSI, the would be little point. Reason is that under full reserve, money in 
safe accounts is effectively lodged at the central bank anyway. 
 
Fine tuning under full reserve would not be perfect? 
There are two traditional methods of fine tuning: fiscal and monetary, 
with interest rate adjustment being the main monetary tool. If commercial 
banks are barred from lending money into existence, that rather rules 
out interest rate adjustments as a demand regulating tool, since those 
rate adjustments work VIA commercial banks. 
As to fiscal fine tuning, that would still be possible under full reserve. 
Indeed, some advocates of full reserve (e.g. Werner (2010)) advocate 
that fine tuning should be done simply by having the government / 
central bank machine print and spend money into the economy as 
required (or do the reverse: raise taxes and withdraw money from the  
economy when inflation looms).  
And the criticism has been made (e.g. by Keen (2012)) that that method 
of fine tuning is not perfect or reliable (which is not to suggest that Keen 
is a strong opponent of full reserve: he is moderately sympathetic). 
Well the simple answer to that is that the above traditional methods of 
fine tuning (fiscal and monetary) have well known defects, to put it 
politely. To put it less politely, those traditional methods have led to a 
disaster: the recent crisis. Thus the above Keen type criticism is hardly a 
crucial weakness in full reserve. Moreover, interest rate adjustments 
have numerous and glaring defects – set out below. 
 
Funding banks via equity is expensive? 
As already pointed out, under full reserve, depositors who want their 
money loaned on or invested become similar in nature to shareholders. 
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And funding via shareholders is more expensive for banks than via 
depositors. Thus assuming that the “lending on” or “investing” part of 
banks is still classified as banking, then banks’ funding might seem to 
become more expensive under full reserve. The flaw in that argument is 
as follows. 
Those supplying equity carry the risk of losing some or all the capital 
they have supplied, and charge for the service provided. However, if the 
total amount of equity funding relative to other forms of funding for a 
bank rises, there is no effect on the total amount of risk. That is, the risk 
per dollar of equity declines. Thus there is no reason to think that the 
total charge made by, or reward required by supplies of equity will 
change. Indeed there is empirical evidence to support that point – see 
Miles (2011).  
Taking the above point to the extreme, if (as under full reserve) 
depositors accept risk and become little different to shareholders, there 
would still be no OVERALL increase in the cost of funding the relevant 
bank. So the above “extra cost of funding” criticism of full reserve does 
not stand inspection (all of which is very roughly a re-statement of the 
Modigliani-Miller theory).   
 
The alleged shadow bank problem. 
A criticism that is sometimes made of full reserve (e.g. by Goodhart 
(2009)) is that if the larger banks are forced to obey the rules of full 
reserve, that will result in shadow banks filling the void. That is, shadow 
banks will up their fractional reserve or money creation activities. A 
similar claim is made by Diamond (2008: p.65). In fact this is not much of 
a problem and for the following four reasons. 
1. It is absurd to implement bank regulations, and then regulate just 
those institutions which have the word “bank” emblazoned over their 
front door, while ignoring relatively large institutions which effectively 
ARE BANKS, but do not actually call themselves such. As Turner 
(2012b) put it, "If it looks like a bank and quacks like a bank, it has got to 
be subject to bank-like safe-guards." Moreover, regulators worldwide 
seem to have realised that shadow banks should be regulated (Masters 
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(2012)). Thus it will be assumed from now on that while there may be 
some small shadow banks that the authorities fail to regulate, the larger 
shadow banks ARE REGULATED. 
2. While the shadow banking industry AS A WHOLE may easily pose 
systemic risks, regulating the larger shadow banks probably disposes of 
that risk. Put another way, governments can probably ignore small 
shadow banks, and better still make it abundantly clear that under no 
circumstances will they mount any sort of rescue of such banks. Thus 
taxpayers needn’t be on the hook for anything here: there needn’t be 
any subsidy involved.  
3. There is a problem for small shadow banks if they want to get into the 
money creation business, and as follows. 
Creating money involves persuading as many players as possible to 
accept and use one’s liabilities as money. And that’s an activity where 
size definitely pays. To illustrate (and taking the “very small” end of the 
scale) any individual person can create money in that they can pay for 
goods or services with an uncrossed cheque, and the payee can 
endorse the cheque and pass it to a third party. And the third party can 
pass it to a fourth, etc. That’s all perfectly legal, and the uncrossed 
cheque is then in effect a form of money. 
But that form of money is almost unheard of. It is extremely cumbersome 
and just cannot compete with a well-run form of money supplied by the 
state or by the commercial banking system. 
Same goes for small shadow banks. They will have no problem pursuing 
their basic activity: connecting large borrowers with large lenders. But 
that process does not create money: it does not amount to fractional 
reserve.  In contrast, it is much harder for a small shadow bank to 
persuade a significant proportion of actors in the economy to accept its 
liabilities and pass them from hand to hand. Or as Minsky (1986, p.228) 
put it, “everyone can create money; the problem is to get it accepted”. 
Of course in the world’s financial centres, numerous small shadow 
banks will be well known to those working in those centres, and that 
small group of people may well treat a small shadow bank’s liabilities as 
money. But then all sorts of strange bits of paper get treated as money 
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in the world’s financial centres: government debt is often accepted in lieu 
of cash in those centres. But that is a small proportion of the total 
amount of money in circulation, thus it would not seriously degrade an 
attempt to switch to full reserve. 
4. If small shadow banks do collapse in significant numbers, there is no 
reason in principle why government and central bank between them 
cannot make up for the deflationary effect of that by printing and 
spending new money into the economy, though clearly getting the timing 
and quantity of new money exactly right is not easy. 
 
Is interest rate instability a problem? 
A criticism sometimes made of full reserve is that it brings interest rate 
instability, as indeed it does. Reason is that given a relatively stable 
money supply, and an increased desire to borrow money, interest rates 
rise. That is in contrast to the current system where central banks control 
or try to control interest rates. Central banks success in that endeavour 
is questionable, as is shown below, but certainly central banks have a 
finite effect on interest rates. But the latter “interest rate instability” 
criticism is not a strong one, and for the following reasons. 
One of the main causes of the recent crisis was that there was an 
increased demand for funds to borrow and invest in property, yet no 
significant interest rate increased came about as a result because 
central banks were using their usual tool to control demand, that is 
interest rates, and neither demand nor inflation were excessive, so 
central banks saw no reason to raise interest rates. 
In contrast, had interest rates responded to market forces, interest rates 
would have risen, which would have dampened the speculation at least 
to some extent. As to any undesirable deflationary effect that would have 
had, governments could easily have compensated with fiscal stimulus. 
And there is actually a very long list of defects in interest rate 
adjustments as a tool for controlling demand or inflation and as follows. 
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First, several reasons are given in Werner (2010), and in the various 
works referred to in that work. But there are further weaknesses in 
interest rate adjustments as follows. 
1. Adjusting interest rates is distortionary. That is, an interest rate 
change works only via households or firms which are significantly reliant 
on variable rate loans: i.e. those reliant on FIXED rate loans or not 
reliant on loans at all are not affected by an interest rate change. Thus 
this policy makes no more sense than boosting an economy only via 
people with black hair, with blondes, red-heads, etc waiting for a trickle-
down effect. 
2. The idea that there is a close relationship between interest rates and 
the ACTUAL availability of credit is an idea that is hardly supported by 
events over the last two years or so. That is rates have been at record 
low levels, but banks have been reluctant to lend. 
3. An interest rate reduction tends to cause asset price bubbles. In 
contrast, a straightforward change in government net spending has less 
of a “bubble blowing” effect. That is, if the additional net spending is 
directed at a cross section of the population (not just the wealthy), there 
will not be a significant asset bubble effect. 
4. The optimum price for borrowed money (i.e. the optimum rate of 
interest) is determined by the same sort of factors that determine the 
optimum price for concrete, steel or any other commodity: supply and 
demand. That is, the rate of interest is optimised when the marginal 
disutility of forgone consumption by savers equals the marginal utility or 
marginal benefit that derives from borrowing (which in the case of 
borrowing which is used to fund investment, equals the benefit derived 
from investments.) 
If government interferes with this free market rate of interest, then the 
total amount invested will not be optimum. GDP will not be maximised. 
5. Low interest rates allegedly encourage investment. Unfortunately 
those making investments look at LONG TERM rates, not the fact that 
the central bank has recently cut rates and will probably raise them 
again in two years’ time. And that applies both to firms which invest and 
people who borrow with a view to buying houses. 
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While most people will not buy a house just because interest rates have 
dropped for a couple of years, there ARE those who are attracted by 
temporarily reduced rates, for example the so called “No Income No Job 
or Assets” mortgagors. So in that the “low interest rates encourages 
investment” argument DOES WORK, it works to a significant extent by 
encouraging irresponsibility: not a good argument for interest rate 
adjustment. 
6. The idea that reduced interest rates encourage investment is of 
questionable benefit given the fact that in a recession,(certainly in 
SHORT recessions or the initial stages of a longer recession) there is 
more than the usual amount of capital equipment lying idle! Of course it 
takes TIME to manufacture or create real investments like machinery or 
factories, and assuming an economy will return to trend growth shortly 
after a recession, employers need to make sure they are not SHORT of 
capital equipment after a recession. But employers do not need 
governments to tell them this. Nor will small inducements like 2% 
changes in interest rates do much to optimise any given employer’s 
investment strategy. 
7. Radcliffe Report on monetary policy in the U.K. published in 1960 
concluded that ‘there can be no reliance on interest rate policy as a 
major short-term stabiliser of demand’. 
8. There seems to be no relationship between base rates and rates 
charge by credit card operators. See UK CreditCards (2009). Indeed 
there even seems to be an INVERSE relationship in that in 2011 when 
central bank rates were at a record low, credit cards rates were at a 
record high (Insley (2011)). 
9. Keynes said, “I am now somewhat skeptical of the success of a 
merely monetary policy directed towards influencing the rate of 
interest...it seems likely that the fluctuations in the market estimation of 
the marginal efficiency of different types of capital...will be too great to 
be offset by any practicable changes in the rate of interest." Keynes’s 
General Theory – near the end of Ch 12. 
10. It is sometimes argued that monetary policy (interest rate 
adjustments at any rate) can be made quickly, i.e. fiscal changes take 
longer to implement. 
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That point is irrelevant. The IMPORTANT question is TOTAL TIME LAG 
between the decision to implement a policy and the actual effect. 
11. Where government borrows, some of the money is inevitably lent by 
foreigners. But there is a problem there, which is that money flowing into 
a country from abroad temporarily boosts living standards in the country. 
And that standard of living boost will be reversed if and when the money 
is repaid. 
Now those standard of living “gyrations”, have nothing to do with solving 
the basic problem, namely raising employment. The gyrations are an 
unnecessary and complicating factor. Plus, the temporary boost to living 
standards poses big temptations for politicians: it enables them to raise 
living standards while in office, while the mess is left for their successors 
to sort out. 
A further point in connection with “foreign” effects is that the effect of 
interest rate adjustments is hindered by foreign currency movements. 
That is, a rise in interest rates designed to damp down an overheated 
economy draws foreign capital into the relevant county, which reduces 
the desired effect. In contrast, a straight cut in government spending has 
the opposite effect, if anything, on internationally mobile capital. That is, 
given a cut in demand in a particular country, capital will tend to leave 
the country in search of better opportunities elsewhere. 
12. There is disagreement amongst economists as to how effective 
monetary and fiscal policies are. That little problem can be solved by 
doing both policies at once. If one policy is much more effective than 
another, it doesn’t matter: the COMBINATION is almost guaranteed to 
work.  
Conclusion: the list of defects in interest rate adjustments as a regulatory 
tool is a long one. 
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